solution to the indexical version of Frege's Puzzle in terms of the character of linguistic expressions has been greatly influential and much discussed. Many philosophers regard it as being correct, or at least as being on the right track. However, little has been said about how character is supposed to apply to proper names, and how it could account for the name version of the Puzzle. In this paper I want to fill this gap. I sketch some solutions to the name version of Frege's Puzzle in terms of character, and argue that all of them are flawed in some way: they are either semantically implausible or fail to account for all relevant phenomena. It seems clear that the cognitive values of those sentences are different, even though the sin ular terms they contain refer precisely to the same thing. Sentences (a) are trivial, while sentences (b) ap ear informative. A eaker can sincerely accept (c) sentences and at the same time sincerely reject (d) sentences (and vice-versa) without being ir ational. But how is this possile? How can the mere substitution of coreferential expressions affect the cognitive value of a sentence? What accounts for the difference in their epistemic profiles if they refer to the sa e object? This is what is traditiona ly ca led Frege's Puzzle. Kaplan (1989a) managed to deal with the indexical version of the Puzzle quite we l. In his theory, indexicals have two levels of meaning: chara er and content. The content of an indexical is the contribution it makes to the proposition expressed. Since Kaplan is a referentialist, the content of an indexical just is the object being refer ed to. Chara er, on the other hand, is the lin uistic rule that is attached to the indexical that determines the content in a context. More precisely, the chara er is a function from contexts to contents, and this function is associated with the indexical by the rules of
It seems clear that the cognitive values of those sentences are different, even though the sin ular terms they contain refer precisely to the same thing. Sentences (a) are trivial, while sentences (b) ap ear informative. A eaker can sincerely accept (c) sentences and at the same time sincerely reject (d) sentences (and vice-versa) without being ir ational. But how is this possile? How can the mere substitution of coreferential expressions affect the cognitive value of a sentence? What accounts for the difference in their epistemic profiles if they refer to the sa e object? This is what is traditiona ly ca led Frege's Puzzle. Kaplan (1989a) managed to deal with the indexical version of the Puzzle quite we l. In his theory, indexicals have two levels of meaning: chara er and content. The content of an indexical is the contribution it makes to the proposition expressed. Since Kaplan is a referentialist, the content of an indexical just is the object being refer ed to. Chara er, on the other hand, is the lin uistic rule that is attached to the indexical that determines the content in a context. More precisely, the chara er is a function from contexts to contents, and this function is associated with the indexical by the rules of lan uage. Because of this, it is plausi le to think of it as the linuistic meaning of indexicals that is known by every competent eaker. Clearly, Kaplan cannot ap eal to contents to account for the differences in cognitive value between sentences of the first set above, for they a l have the same content. So, it must be the chara er, not the content, that explains cognitive value: since the chara ers of 'I' and 'he' are obviously different (they are different functions from contexts to contents: the chara er of 'he' is something like 'the discriminated male' and the chara er of 'I' is 'the producer of this token'), and they are known by every competent eake , those sentences may differ in cognitive value even if they refer to the same object. They refer to the same thing, but, since their descriptive rules are distinct, they do so in different cognitively significant manners.
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The name version of the Puzzle, however, is nowhere near as amena le as its indexical version to a solution in terms of chara er. The reason for this is simple: for most referentialists (including Kaplan), names are just labels for their referents. There is no other level of meaning to a proper name other than the object that it stands for. In short, the meaning of a proper name is exhausted by its referent. If this is right, then a l coreferential names, no matter how synta ica ly distinct, have exactly the sa e meaning. Or, as Kaplan puts it, in proper names "a l three kinds of meaning-referent, content, and chara er-co lapse.
[…] Because of the co lapse of chara er, content, and referent, it is not unnatural to say of proper names that they have no meaning other than their referent" (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 562) . Therefore, there is no difference in meaning between 'Far okh Bulsara' and 'Fre die Mercury' that can be exploited by the referentialist in order to account for the difference in cognitive value of the sentences in the second set above. A l there is to the semantics of coreferential names is simply identical. How can one account for the cognitive value of proper names in terms of chara er, then 3 ? Kaplan himself acknowledges the difficulty (e.g. Kaplan, 1989a, p. 562) . His theory simply does not have enough resources to solve Frege' s Puzzle as arising for names. In fact, this is a reason to su ect in principle his attempt to explain cognitive value via chara er, even in the case of indexicals. If we have a phenomenon and a theoretical entity that purports to explain it, then the fact that this entity does not even begin to explain a recognized subclass of the same phenomenon gives us enough reason to su ect that it was not the entity that we were looking for in the first place. Therefore, if chara er rea ly has this sup osed epistemic dimension, it should have this dimension for a l sin ular terms, not only for indexicals. In other words: if cognitive value could plausi ly be explained by chara er, then a l phenomena of cognitive value should at least be initia ly treata le via chara er. But, in the case of proper names, they clearly are not. Chara ers seem i l suited to explain the cognitive value of names right from the outset. If this is cor ect, then it looks like that the ap arent relation between cognitive value and chara er in the case of indexicals that Kaplan was so enthusiastic about was merely incidental.
But let us not be so pessimistic. Perhaps Kaplan is wrong about proper names. Perhaps they do have more than one level of meaning besides the referent. If chara er and content in proper names do not coincide in the way that Kaplan believes they do, then maybe chara er is a le solve the name version of the Puzzle after a l. This, of course, is obviously a major deviation from Kaplan's original theory. But, as we have seen, if the referentialist does not part ways with Kaplan regarding proper names, then she has no hope when it comes to solving the name version of the puzzle in terms of chara er.
There are several candidates for the chara ers of proper names, but it seems clear that a l of them wi l be descriptions of some sort. Since chara ers are rules that determine the content, they must be given descriptively, just like the chara ers of indexicals. It is important to stress that this is in no way incompati le with direct reference. The bi gest lesson we take from direct reference is that names are not equivalent to descriptions at the level of content (i.e., they do not contribute descriptive material to propositions). It is perfectly compati le with the general referentialist framework, then, for proper names to have a level of descriptive meaning just as indexicals do. The descriptions that state the chara ers of proper names have to function like descriptions coupled with Kaplan' s dthat operator:
4 they wi l express conditions that must be satisfied by an object in order for it to be their extension, but contribute only their extension to propositional content. In short, the dthat operator turns descriptions into directly referential terms. The chara er of a proper name, then, could very we l function as a description of its bearer combined with a dthat operator.
However, contrary to indexicals, which have more or less easily stata le descriptive chara ers, finding which descriptions are good candidates for the chara ers of proper names is an enormously difficult task. Since these descriptions function as chara ers, they have to somehow be cognitively accessi le to a l eakers who are competent regarding the name in question, and they must be responsi le for determining its referent. The options seem to be the fo lowing:
(1) Causal-historical chain description (2) Specific-name metalin uistic description (3) Gene ic-name metalin uistic description (4) Context-sensitive description
Options (1) and (2) are more conservative, for they treat names as non-indexicals, i.e., as expressions whose chara er is constant and whose content does not depend on certain parameters of the context, exactly like Kaplan does. Options (3) and (4), on the other hand, treat proper names as indexicals, i.e., as expressions whose chara er is context-sensiti e, and thus are a far cry from Kaplan's theory. Let us begin by examining option (1).
Many people, including Kaplan, were convinced by Kripke's causal-historical picture of how names refer. According to Kripke (1980) , a given tokening of a name refers to the object it does because it is part of chain that goes back to an initial baptism, when the name was first introduced as the name of the baptized object. This name is passed on from eaker to eaker, and it is in virtue of being causa ly connected to the object itself that my utterance of that name refers to the precise object it does. In short, the reference is fixed externa ly, by the name's ancestry, not by some fact internal to my cognition.
It is also important to stress that, in this picture, names are individuated in terms of baptism ceremonies. So two coreferential names are the sa e na e if and only if they were introduced in the sa e ceremony. Conversely, two coreferential names are different if and only if they were introduced to the lin uistic community in two different baptisms. Hence, to each name cor esponds one and only one causal-historical chain, which originates in a baptism ceremony. A consequence of this view is that, for example, a noun like 'Ludovic' wi l be systematica ly ambi uous: there is no single name 'Ludovic' , but as many different names-e led identica ly-as there have been baptism ceremonies. In fact, if the sa e person is named 'Ludovic' twice in two distinct ceremonies, there wi l be two distinct na es elt 'Ludovic' , not a single one. 6 Kaplan believes that the role of this causal chain is pre-se antic or, as he puts it, metase antic (Cf. Kaplan, 1989b, p. 573) . This means that the causal chain is not somehow built into the meaning of a given proper name; it functions only to determine hic name is being used, and hence which thing is being refer ed to. So, on a given occasion of discourse in which a name is used, contextual cues determine which causal chain is being exploited, and thus which name is being tokened, in the same way that contextual cues determine the meaning of an ambi uous expression such as 'bank' . This is completely different from the way in which context determines the content of an indexical expression: for indexicals, context-sensitivity is built into thei c ara ers, and thus into their meanings, whereas names have a context-insensitive meaning. In other words, the referent of a name is not determined in virtue of an a ect of its meaning, but pre-semantica ly, by the chain that brought the name to the eaker. Context is relevant only in determining hic chain is being exploited. The context does not include a parameter to which the meaning of the name is sensitive. In short, for Kaplan, causal chains merely fix the referent in Kripke's sense; they are not encoded in the name's meaning.
Option (1) is the view that, contrary to Kaplan and Kripke, causal chains are in fact encoded in the name's meaning. More precisely, they are encoded at the level of c ara e . So, on this view, the chara er of a name 'N' would be given by a description such as '[dthat] the individual who lies at the other end of the historical chain that brought this token of "N" to me' . As Kaplan puts it, such a theory wi l "regard the historical chain theory as a part of semantics, as gi ing the meaning rather than as te ling us how to discover it" (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 574) . If this is plausi le, then names would have two layers of meaning after a l: the chara er, which is given by a description of the causal chain that introduced the name to the community, and the content, which is exhausted by its referent. This is why sentences like (2a), (2b), (2c), and (2d) have different epistemic profiles. Since the names 'Fre die Mercury' and 'Far okh Bulsara' have clearly distinct causal histories, they have distinct chara ers. If they have distinct chara ers, and chara er is tied to cognitive value, then they have different cognitive values. Voilà: sentences (2a), (2b), (2c), and (2d) differ in cognitive value even though they have the same content.
There are two main pro lems with this solution. The first has nothing to do with Frege's Puzzle, however. It is about the cognitive role that causal chain descriptions sup ose ly play. The chara ers of indexicals are more intuitively conceived as lin uistic meanings because they are, in some sense, gra ed by every eaker of the lan uage. And the descriptions that state these chara ers are fairly simple. Causal descriptions, on the other hand, are much more complex and seem much more cognitively demanding. It is not very intuitive to say that causal descriptions are rules that have to be mastered by competent eakers for the cor ect use of names: they require substantive beliefs about baptisms, causal connections, lin uistic communities, etc. These sorts of beliefs may or may not be required for the lin uistic pra ice in general. But so are beliefs about sounds, symbols, behaviors and a l sorts of beliefs about the world which are not built into meanings. The idea that the chara er of a name is a description of its causal chain, then, is somewhat implausi le.
Second, and more seriously, this proposal does not solve Frege's Puzzle for names even if it is semantica ly plausi le. Consider the fo lowing situation described by Kaplan: (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 563) .
If option (1) is right, there is just one baptism ceremony in this case, so there is just one name with a single chara er, ca l it 'N' . When I encounter this name again, it may nevertheless be informative for me to be told that 'N is N' , even though I was the one who introduced it in the first place. The name does not even have to be phonologica ly distorted; it can be elt and pronounced in the exact same way as when I introduced it. This also occurs in Paderewski-like scenarios. It may be informative for me to be told that 'Paderewski is Paderewski' even though both occur ences of the name exploit the sa e causal chain and thus have the same chara er. How can this be possi le? Option (1), then, seems barely tena le as a solution to Frege's Puzzle. Option (2) seems a little more plausi le, but it suffers from the same pro lem when it comes to explaining informativeness. This option presup oses much of the causal-historical picture of how names are individuated, but the descriptions that state the chara ers of names are much less cognitively demanding than descriptions of causal chains. They are metalin uistic descriptions like '[dthat] the bearer of 'N'' . As seems clear, this description is a piece of knowledge that everyone acquires upon learning a new name, so they can more plausi ly function as cognitively accessi le characters. Note that in option (2) names are ecific, i.e., they are individuated in terms of the baptisms by which they were introduced. As explained earlier, on this kind of view there is no single name 'Ludovic' with a single meaning, but many different names e led identica ly, each with one single meaning. We can express this fact by subscripting the names: 'Ludovic '' , and so on. This uarantees that the description picks out the right individual, because the causal chain determines which ecific name is loaded into the chara er, and the chara er then determines the content. This explains why it can be informative to be told that 'Ludovic . This sentence should be trivial, but it is not.
Let us now look at option (3). As mentioned above, this option treats names as indexicals. This is already very suspicious. As Kaplan says, "those who su gest that proper names are merely one ecies of indexical depreciate the power and the mystery of the causal chain theory" (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 563) . But let us give it a shot. In this view, names are not individuated by baptisms. They are conceived as generic nouns. Thus, a generic name like 'Paderewski' (or 'Ludovic') wi l have a single, context-sensiti e chara er-'[dthat] the bearer of 'Paderewski''-which wi l refer to whoever is ca led 'Paderewski' in the context of its use. In other words, this option attributes to the generic name 'Paderewski' one univocal metalin uistic and context-sensitive meaning, which determines its content in a context. Generic names, then, function exactly like indexicals such as 'here' and 'I' .
Nee less to say, this option is not very persuasive in its own right. Generic names do not ap ear to have meanings by themselves without being associated with a particular object; generic names are precisely that: gene ic 8 . Moreover, if there is just one single chara er for every possi le occur ence of 'Paderewski' , we wi l run into serious semantic pro lems. Sup ose that there are two different men ca led 'Paderewski' in a given context. If I say 'Paderewski is ta ler than Paderewski' , both occur ences of the generic name 'Paderewski' in that sentence wi l have the same chara er in the same context, and hence should determine the sa e content. In short, this sentence would refer to the same man twice, and thus would express a contradiction. This is obviously absurd, because what I said is perfectly reasona le, and may even be evidently true. To avoid this pro lem, we wi l have to say either that (a) the context shifts midsentence, uaranteeing that each occurrence of 'Paderewski' refers to a different individual, or (b) that the chara ers of each occur ence of 'Paderewski' are somehow different, so that different objects are determined by them; otherwise, this sentence wi l always come out false.
However, if we maintain that (a) the context shifts midsentence while the chara er of 'Paderewski' remains the same, then there should never be any informative occur ence of 'Paderewski is Paderewski' . In other terms, every possi le occur ence of 'Paderewski is Paderewski' wi l tri ger a shift in 7 Cf. Kripke (2011) for his exposition of the famous Paderewski case. 8 If one defends the predicate view of names, as Burge (1973) and Fara (2015) do, then generic names do have meanings; they function like predicates that are true of objects that have those names (thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out). I find this position extremely counter-intuitive, but I will not argue against it here. In fact, I suspect that, even if such views are plausible, they would still suffer from the same kind of problem in accounting for Frege's Puzzle as the views I am discussing.
context; but, since the chara ers remain identical, every occur ence of this sentence should turn out trivial. But clearly there are non-trivial occur ences of 'Paderewski is Paderewski' , as Kripke ar ued. In order to explain cognitive value in terms of chara er, there cannot be a difference in cognitive value without a difference in chara er. So, saying that the context shifts midsentence solves a semantic pro lem (it uarantees that the right individuals are picked out), but this view fails to account for Frege's Puzzle.
Alternatively, we can say that (b) the chara er of 'Paderewski' changes in each occur ence of the name, while the context remains the same. This would force us, however, to hold that chara ers are occurrence indi iduated, i.e., that each new occur ence of the name wi l produce a different chara er. Remember, this is required in order for the theory to deliver the cor ect result: if the chara ers in 'Paderewski is ta ler than Paderewski' are not individuated in terms of their occur ences, this sentence wi l always express a contradiction. But we cannot consistently and in a non-a -hoc way maintain that chara ers are occur ence individuated just for these pro lematic cases. They are not semantica ly ecial in any sense. Hence, chara ers must be occur ence individuated for all cases. Note that this view delivers the cor ect result even for cases where two distinct occur ences refer to the same object. Sup ose I do want to express a contradiction with 'Paderewski is ta ler than Paderewski' . There is nothing semantica ly implausi le about two distinct chara ers determining the same content in the same context, thus delivering the intended contradiction -just as I can say 'I am ta ler than him' while pointing to a mir or. This is perfectly in line with Kaplan's framework: two different chara ers can determine the same object in the same context, but not necessarily so. If this is right, however, there should neve be an uninfor ati e case of 'Paderewski is Paderewski' . Since every numerica ly distinct occur ence of 'Paderewski' would produce a different chara er, then they should always have different epistemic profiles. Yet this is clearly false, for there are trivial cases of 'Paderewski is Paderewski' (when Paderewski himself utters this sentence, for example). We also have no compe ling semantic reasons to say that the chara ers of 'Paderewski' are identical in trivial cases and different in informative ones. Aside from considerations about cognitive value, those cases have no significant semantic differences that justify ecial semantic treatment.
This leaves option (4). On this view, names function just like indexicals, but their chara ers vary from eaker to eaker or even for the same eaker in different occasions. Each eaker, then, attributes he own chara er to a given name in a given context, and this chara er determines the content. In a sense, this view is very similar to Fregean and Russe lian descriptivism: each eaker associates one definite description with a name in a context of use, and this description determines the referent. Just like traditional descriptivism, in option (4) there is no single privileged description community-wise or even eaker-wise; as long as the referent remains the same, there is (ap arently) no pro lem. The main difference is that, contrary to traditional descriptivism, these descriptions are not encoded in the propositional content of sentences containing names; they are turned into directly referential terms and are confined to the level of chara er. So, for instance, if I say 'Socrates is a great person' and associate the description 'the greatest soccer player from Ribeirão Preto' with 'Socrates' , its character wi l be something like '[dthat] the greatest soccer player from Ribeirão Preto' for me. The content, of course, would be just Socrates himself. Similarly, my audience may associate different descriptions, and thus different chara ers, with the same name. In other words, this view claims that chara ers vary contextua ly, based on the sort of information the eaker has about the referent and what sort of information is relevant in the context of communication.
This is why 'Paderewski is Paderewski' can be informative to me: I associate different descriptions with each occurrence of the name, and thus the chara er of this sentence would be something like '[dthat] the pianist ca led 'Paderewski' is [dthat] the statesman ca led 'Paderewski'' . The propositional content is just a self-identity, but the chara ers of the two occur ences of the name 'Paderewski' are different, so it is an infor ati e self-identity. And this also explains why the same sentence can be trivial: if I associate the same chara er with both occur ences of 'Paderewski' , then 'Paderewski is Paderewski' wi l turn out to be uninformative to me.
In sum, then, this view claims that the chara ers of names are only determined in the eaker's idiolect by the information she has, not by general rules of lan uage. Moreover, proper names turn out to be mere placeholders for definite descriptions, for they do not have constant meanings at the level of chara er, much like the dthat operator itself. Because this view is so similar to Fregeanism and Russellianism about proper names, they solve Frege's Puzzle more or less in the same manner. A ditiona ly, this view manages to avoid Kripke's modal ar uments, because the description associated with a name is not expressed at the level of content. These descriptions are also not merely rigidified: they are turned into genuine directly referential expressions by something like the dthat operator. Fina ly, contrary to Kaplan's theory, chara ers of names wi l no longer be constant functions, but merely functions from contexts to contents just like any other indexical.
However, though it avoids Kripke's modal ar ument, option (4) does not avoid his semantic ar ument. If it is my job to associate a description, and thus a chara er, with a name on an occasion of use, then my utterance wi l determine the wrong object if I associate the wrong information with the name. Think of the name 'Einstein' . If I associate the description 'the father of the atomic bomb' with it, then its chara er wi l be '[dthat] the father of the atomic bomb' and wi l pick out whoever satisfies this description. This chara er, of course, does not determine Einstein, but Op enheimer. Therefore, the proposition I express wi l be a proposition about Op en-heimer, and not about Einstein. This, of course, runs counter to we l-e a lished ar uments about reference-determination for proper names. Moreover, we intuitively say that I have false beliefs about Einstein, not that I am thinking and saying true things about Op enheimer. If chara ers of proper names are determined internalistica ly, in my idiolect, then it is always possi le for my utterances to determine the wrong objects if I have mistaken beliefs about them.
A ditiona ly, this picture makes communication very mysterious. If the chara ers of names are potentia ly multiplied by a l the eakers in a given situation, how do we explain their grasp of hat is said? If there is no significant overlap between the information eakers associate with the name uttered in a given occasion, then the route to reference wi l be so different for each of them that it seems very hard to explain how they ar ive at the same content and know that they do so. In fact, it seems rather miraculous. As with indexicals, we intuitively say that it is the job of the eake to exploit a single chara er that must be gra ed and interpreted by the audience. In short, reference seems to be a two-place relation between eaker (or expression-in-context) and reference, not an n-place relation between every single person in a communication exchange and the referent. Of course, we may associate a huge body of information with a given name, but to claim that we also expres or display this information through an utterance of this name, even if this is done ia chara er, is hard to swa low. Worse yet, if I have conflicting individuating information about a given object, I refer successfu ly to it only if I hap en to associate the right description when I use it; otherwise, I wi l refer to something else. Not even my own uses of the name wi l be consistent, on this view.
It seems, then, that a l options for explaining the name version of Frege' Puzzle in terms of chara er are flawed in some sense. They either fail to account for cognitive value or are semantica ly implausi le. This brings us back to the point I raised at the beginning of the paper: if chara er is una le to account for the cognitive value of proper names successfu ly, then we have serious reasons to su ect that it also fails to account for the cognitive value of indexicals. Kaplan's solution to the indexical version of Frege's Puzzle certainly seems plausi le, but close scrutiny may reveal that the ap arent relation between chara er and cognitive value is only accidental. But this is a matter for another investigation.
